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I. Introduction
A former National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”)
athlete has filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of past and
current NCAA athletes against their former universities and
those universities’ sports marketing agencies, for injunctive
relief and damages arising from alleged violations of federal
antitrust and state labor and industry laws.


J.D. Candidate, May 2019. Jason is a Case Note and Comment Editor for
Pace Law Review and an Associate at Messner Reeves, LLP, pending Bar
admission. Jason has close ties with college athletics—growing up on West
Point, New York, his father was employed as an athletic administrator for
the United States Military Academy. He was also a student-athlete at Marist
College. Jason would like to thank his family for all of their encouragement
and support.
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The lawsuit, Spielman v. IMG College, arose when Ohio
State University (“OSU”) entered into a marketing deal through
their marketing agency, IMG College (“IMG”), with corporations
Honda Motor Co. (“Honda”) and Nike USA Inc. (“Nike”), to hang
banners depicting images of former college athletes at school
sporting events. Charles “Chris” Spielman, the named Plaintiff
and former NCAA football player at OSU, brought this lawsuit
because he claims that OSU and IMG unreasonably and illegally
restrained trade by denying him the right to profit from his
name, image, and likeness.1
This case plays a role in the ongoing conversation of whether
NCAA athletes should be able to receive monetary compensation
for their contributions to amateur athletics. Spielman alleges in
his Complaint that the actions of OSU and IMG are contrary to
a decision in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that
the NCAA’s compensation rules were subject to antitrust
scrutiny.2 A decision in this case has the potential to have a
major effect on the current form of the NCAA.
Spielman has filed in the District Court of Ohio, which falls
under the jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Spielman cites a decision made in the Ninth Circuit stemming
from a case in which former NCAA basketball player, Ed
O’Bannon, sued the NCAA, saying that its amateurism rules
were an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act because
they prevented NCAA athletes from being compensated for the
use of their name, image, and likeness.3 The Sherman Act
declares illegal any conspiracy which operates to force
unreasonable terms and conditions upon independent traders
and unduly limits their liberty to do business in interstate
markets.4 O’Bannon brought his case after he saw his own
personal features being used in a video game. He was not
compensated for, nor did he authorize the use of these
characteristics in the game.

1. Class Action Complaint at 3, Spielman et al. v. IMG College, LLC et
al., No. 2:17-CV-00612, 2017 WL 3015658 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 2017).
2. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2015).
3. Id.
4. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
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The conversation regarding compensation of the collegiate
athletes has extended to whether current NCAA athletes can
form a players’ union. This has been addressed directly by the
NCAA5 after football players attempted to organize at
Northwestern University.6 Spielman’s lawsuit gains more
significance as this conversation continues. It is likely that, as
more people consider this issue, duplicative lawsuits may be
filed in the future by former NCAA athletes who find themselves
position comparable to Spielman and O’Bannon. In a statement,
Spielman has expressed his concern regarding “the exploitation
of all former players.”7 If the case is brought before the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals and there is a decision adverse to
Spielman, there is the potential for a circuit split, which may
compel the Supreme Court of the United States to grant
certiorari if requested. This case may result in a decision that
will open the door for former, and perhaps even current, college
athletes to receive compensation for their contributions to NCAA
athletics.
II. Background
Chris Spielman has achieved celebrity status because of his
prowess as an NCAA athlete. His unique talents and ability on
the football field at OSU led to a career as a professional athlete
and television personality.8 Spielman played for twelve years in

5. Donald Remy, NCAA Responds to Union Proposal, NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-rele
ases/ncaa-responds-union-proposal (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
6. Loretta8, Friendly Reminder: The NCAA Invented the Term “StudentAthlete to Get Out of Paying Worker’s Comp, SB NATION: INSIDE NU (Jan. 28,
2014, 8:57 PM), https://www.insidenu.com/2014/1/28/5355988/ncaa-studentathlete-kain-colter-union-workers-comp.
7. Athletic Staff, Spielman Sues OSU Over Use of Athletes’ Image,
ATHLETIC (July 7, 2017), https://theathletic.com/76313/2017/07/17/spielmansues-osu-over-use-of-athletes-image/ (stating “[m]y concern is about the
exploitation of all former players across this nation who do not have the
platform to stand up for themselves while universities and corporations benefit
financially by selling their name and likenesses without their individual
consent. . . . My hope is that this litigation will level the playing field for those
affected players, and that they too can benefit from the dollars flowing into
collegiate athletics.”).
8. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 8.
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the National Football League (“NFL”)9 and is now employed as
an analyst for FOX NFL.10 He was able to maintain a valuable
reputation while he was at OSU, yet he was not able to profit
from it while he was a student at OSU because of NCAA rules
against compensation.11 He decided to file this lawsuit after his
image, and the images of other prominent former players, were
used on corporate sponsored banners that were hung at football
games in OSU’s stadium. The banners were a way for the OSU
athletic association to generate revenue, as OSU entered into
deals with Honda and Nike to sponsor the banners in exchange
for advertising space at OSU sporting events.12 Spielman argues
that if OSU seeks corporate sponsorships, they should engage
the person whose name, image, and likeness they seek to use in
the negotiations. Clearly, Spielman’s and other athletes’
reputations are valuable—as evidenced by licensing deals
between OSU, IMG, Honda, and Nike—so it is likely that
Spielman would be able to profit if he was party to the licensing
deal. Because Spielman is no longer under the restraints of
NCAA amateurism rules, he, and others in the proposed class,
would be allowed to seek compensation for the use of his NIL if
there is a decision in his favor.
While not yet a federal class action, Spielman seeks class
action status so that others similarly situated will be able to join
the lawsuit.13 Sixty-three other former players, including Archie
Griffin, another prominent former OSU football player, were
also featured on the banners.14 Celebrities such as Spielman
and Griffin may be considered among the most recognizable
names and people associated with NCAA football because of
their achievements on the field.
9. Id.
10.
Chris
Spielman,
FOX
SPORTS:
PRESS
PASS,
http://www.foxsports.com/presspass/bios/on-air/chris-spielman (last visited
Feb. 15, 2019).
11. Amateurism, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/
student-athletes/future/amateurism (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (exhibiting
NCAA amateurism rules prohibiting student athletes from entering into
contracts with agencies).
12. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2 (showing that, while
Honda and Nike are not named Defendants, they have been listed as coconspirators).
13. Athletic Staff, supra note 7.
14. Id.
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OSU enjoys immense popularity across the nation, and its
fan base is among the largest for collegiate athletics.15 It is not
difficult to surmise why major corporations like Honda or Nike
would seek advertising space in OSU’s sports facilities. With the
outstanding attendance16 at OSU football games and other
sporting events, and through the various television deals that
OSU has through their athletic conference, The Big Ten,17
corporations are able to reach their target audience. The
advertising is not only effective,18 but also cost-efficient,
considering that, as Spielman alleges, major parties are left out
the negotiations completely, and do not have to be compensated
if the current model is allowed to continue.
Spielman and Griffin’s images are valuable because of the
fame and celebrity that they enjoy, which is a product of their
exemplary skill and hard work portrayed while playing football.
OSU seeks to use these images to attract fans to their stadiums,
so these fans can be accosted by the advertisements of major
corporations. In short, the corporations want to advertise in
OSU stadiums using images of people like Spielman because his
reputation is valuable. However, the images that make the
banners valuable can be acquired by OSU without compensating
the person who owns it because of NCAA rules that promote
amateurism. Nevertheless, these rules shouldn’t even apply to
Spielman because he is no longer a NCAA athlete and, therefore,
is not subject to NCAA regulations.
The revenue that the NCAA generates through amateur
competition is astronomical: $871.6 million of reported revenue
from 2011 to 2012, while the 231 NCAA Division I schools (with
data available) generated a total of $9.15 billion during the 2015

15. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 12.
16. Id.
17. Ryan Connors, Big Ten Confirms TV Deals With CBS, ESPN, FOX,
LAND 10 (July 24, 2017, 1:08 PM), https://www.landof10.com/big-ten/big-tentv-contract-cbs-espn-fox.
18. Rich Exner, Ohio State Buckeyes Sports Money by the Numbers,
CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 25, 2017, 11:33 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/data
central/index.ssf/2017/03/ohio_state_buckeyes_sports_mon.html
(stating
“royalties licensing, advertisements and sponsorships brought in $17.2
million”).
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fiscal year.19 OSU accounted for $170.8 million of that total.20
Spielman argues that the former NCAA athletes who are unable
to profit from the reputation they created while in school should
be allowed to do so once they are no longer under the jurisdiction
of the NCAA regulations, and that excluding them from the
negotiations is an unreasonable restraint on trade.21
III. Jurisdictional Issues
OSU is a state university funded by the public, so it is an
extension of the state of Ohio. In Hans v. Louisiana, the
Supreme Court held that each state enjoys sovereign immunity
and, therefore, cannot be sued in federal court without consent.22
Because of this, the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to
OSU. Spielman has filed this lawsuit in the Southern District
of Ohio, claiming jurisdiction on the ground that this is a
violation of a federal law. Ohio has partially waived its
sovereign immunity, which means that all claims against the
state of Ohio must be brought in the Ohio Court of Claims.23
As mentioned, Spielman seeks class action status so all
similarly affected plaintiffs can join the lawsuit. It can take a
long time to convince a federal judge to allow this case to proceed
as a class action because he or she must consider and decide
whether all of the plaintiffs are similarly affected.24 In the
O’Bannon decision, it took four and one-half years before
O’Bannon was able to obtain class action status. However, there
were over 10,000 plaintiffs in that case.25
19. PETER SMOLIANOV, SPORT DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HIGH
PERFORMANCE AND MASS PARTICIPATION 42 (Routledge 2014); Where Does the
Money Go?, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/finances/revenue (last visited Feb. 15, 2019); see also Cork Gaines,
The Difference in How Much Money Schools Make off of College Sports Is
Jarring, and It Is the Biggest Obstacle to Paying Athletes, BUS. INSIDER (Oct.
14, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider .com/ncaa-schools-collegesports-revenue-2016-10.
20. Exner, supra note 18.
21. See generally Class Action Complaint, supra note 1.
22. 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890).
23. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (LexisNexis 2012).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
25. Jon Solomon, Inside College Sports: Here’s What’s Next for NCAA
After O’Bannon Ruling, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 2, 2015, 1:28 AM), https://www.cbs
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Spielman has amended his original complaint and expanded
the number of defendants to include every school that has used
IMG as a sports marketing agency—a total of eighty-nine
schools, including OSU.26 Spielman says that he amended his
complaint so all former players, and all those who will become
former players, will be protected.27 However, this also plays a
significant part in deciding if this case should be heard in federal
court.
This case isn’t just about suing schools and allowing the
class to collect damages.28 By expanding the class in such a way,
Spielman may increase his chance to have the case heard in
federal court. If the case is heard in federal court, rather than
the Ohio Court of Claims, there will be federal precedence which
will likely dictate policy on how to compensate former players
for the use of their name, image, and likeness.
IV. Analysis
A. The NCAA and its Amateurism Rules
The NCAA was founded in 1906 because of a desire and need
to reform college football in order to make it safer and more
regulated.29 It started as a discussion group and rules-making
body for football, and then was expanded to other sports as more
rule committees were formed. The Sanity Code was the NCAA’s
first attempt to establish guidelines for recruiting and financial
aid. Eventually, the current structure of the NCAA began to
take shape. An executive director was appointed in 1951, and a
sports.com/college-football/news/inside-college-sports-heres-whats-next-forncaa-after-obannon-ruling/.
26. Laura Newpoff, Chris Spielman Lawsuit Against Ohio State, IMG
Expands to 89 Colleges, Impacts Thousands of Players, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST
(Nov. 29, 2017, 11:02 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/columbus/news /2017
/11/28/chris-spielman-lawsuit-against-ohio-state-expands.html.
27. Id.
28. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that he has
demanded the minimum amount of relief allowable in federal court ($75,000)
and that he will donate all money to the OSU athletic department); Athletic
Staff, supra note 7.
29. Concussion Timeline, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.
ncaa.org/sport-science-institute/concussion-timeline (last visited Feb. 15,
2019).
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national headquarters was established in 1952. Walter Byers,
the first executive director, has been credited with inventing the
term student-athlete in 1964 to use as a defense during litigation
when the NCAA successfully avoided paying workers
compensation benefits to athletes.30
The NCAA defines an amateur as someone who has not
profited above his/her actual and necessary expenses or gained
a competitive advantage in his/her sport.31 Amateurism was
adopted as a bedrock principle in order to ensure that NCAA
athletes place first priority on obtaining a quality educational
experience and they are all in equal competition.32 In general,
the amateurism rule prohibits NCAA athletes from: entering
contracts with professional teams, or any sort of agreement to be
represented by an agent; receiving a salary for participating in
athletics, prize money above actual and necessary expenses, or
benefits from an agent or prospective agent; and playing,
practicing or otherwise competing with a professional or
professional team.33
B. The Sherman Act
When it was codified in 1890, the Sherman Act’s primary
purpose was to promote and maintain competition between
businesses in the marketplace.34 In short, the Sherman Act
prohibits the formation and exercise of unreasonable
monopolies. The Rule of Reason analysis was established in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.35
In that case, it was alleged that Defendant oil companies from
various states and other corporations restrained trade and
created monopolies through a deal made in 1870 by John. D.
30. Jon Solomon, ‘Schooled: The Price of College Sports’ Is a Movie Worth
the NCAA History Lesson (Review), AL.COM (Oct. 17, 2013, 6:26 PM),
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/10/schooled_the_price_of_college.htm
l; see also Loretta8, supra note 6.
31. Amateurism, supra note 11.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Christian Dennie, He Shoots, He Scores: An Analysis of O’Bannon v.
NCAA on Appeal and the Future of Intercollegiate Athletics, 93 N.C.L. REV.
ADDENDUM 90, 96 (2015).
35. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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Rockefeller and others. The Court held that the deal fixed
prices, limited production, and controlled transportation of
goods when about 90% of the oil business in Ohio was controlled
by Rockefeller and his associates.36 With that kind of control,
the Defendants were able to force their competitors out of the
market by giving preferential rates and rebates to customers.37
The Court was tasked with interpreting the Sherman Act
because the statute itself does not specifically enumerate or
define a restraint of trade and therefore each case that claims a
violation of the Sherman Act must be decided individually.38 In
his opinion, Chief Justice White established that the Rule of
Reason is, therefore, the standard intended by the statute—that
only monopolies and restraints of trade that are decided to be
unreasonable are illegal.39 In Board of Trade et al. v. United
States, Justice Brandeis articulated how the rule should be
applied.40
The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting
the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.41
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 63.
Id. (emphasis added).
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
Id.
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This decision established the principle that if a defendant
can show that his alleged violations actually promote
competition, then those actions are not unreasonable, and thus
do not violate the Sherman Act.42
C. NCAA v. Board of Regents and the Sherman Act’s Effect on
the NCAA
The Supreme Court, in its seminal decision National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, held that the NCAA
is by no means exempt from these restraints and can be
subjected to scrutiny under the Sherman Act.43 Board of Regents
involved the rights of universities that were members of the
NCAA and their ability to independently negotiate deals with
television networks to broadcast football games on television. In
order to combat the adverse effect that television was having on
live attendance of college football games, the NCAA created a
plan that only permitted one game per week to be broadcast in
any given area and limited each member-university to two
television appearances per season. Originally, the NCAA had a
deal with the American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”) for the
exclusive right to broadcast these games. In response to these
limitations, the College Football Association (“CFA”) was formed
to promote the interests of major football-playing schools within
the NCAA structure.44 Later on, the NCAA entered into
agreements with ABC and the former Columbia Broadcasting
System (now CBS)45 allowing each network to broadcast
fourteen games per season.46 Other restrictions included
“appearance requirements” and “appearance limitations” which
imposed requirements on what the networks could broadcast
and how many times they were able to broadcast certain
schools.47 The NCAA created a rule that “[n]o member . . . is
42. 1 JOSEPH P. BAUER, WILLIAM H. PAGE & EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS § 8.2 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2018) (citing Board of Trade,
246 U.S. at 240–41).
43. See generally 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
44. Id. at 89.
45. Harold L. Erickson, CBS Corporation, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/topic/CBS-Corporation (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
46. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. at 92–93.
47. Id. at 94.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/9
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permitted to make any sale of television rights except in
accordance with the basic plan.”48
Displeased with this
arrangement, the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia, as well
as other members of the CFA, negotiated a different contract
with National Broadcasting Company (“NBC”) which provided
more television appearances and more money.49 The NCAA
publicly threatened to take disciplinary action against any CFA
member that complied with the CFA-NBC contract.50
Horizontal price-fixing, or the artificial setting or
maintenance of prices at a certain level, is contrary to the
workings of a free market among competitors on the same level,
such as retailers throughout an industry.51 Naturally, NCAA
members compete with each other for viewers, making each of
them competitors on the same level. Because the NCAA’s plan
operated to preclude any price negotiations between
broadcasters and member-institutions, the District Court held,
and the Supreme Court agreed, that the NCAA participated in
horizontal price-fixing, and because the NCAA’s plan restrained
the quantity of television rights available for sale, the plan
created a limitation on output.52 The Court opined that these
two practices together is “the paradigm of an unreasonable
restraint of trade.”53 Ordinarily, horizontal price-fixing and
output limitation are per se illegal restraints on trade, so no
further analysis would need to be done in order for a court to
decide that these actions are in violation of the Sherman Act.54
However, the Court found that deciding this case on such
grounds would not be appropriate because the NCAA provided
sufficient procompetitive arguments for these price-fixing and
output limitations that, by their very nature, appear to be
distinctly anti-competition.55
48. Id.
49. Id. at 94–95.
50. Id. at 95.
51. Price-fixing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
52. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99
(1984).
53. Id. at 100 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332,
344–48 (1982)).
54. Id., 468 U.S. at 100.
55. Id. at 103 (finding that, “despite the fact that this case involves
restraints on the ability of member institutions to compete in terms of price

11
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It would be difficult for sports leagues to exist without a
unifying body such as the NCAA. What they are essentially
marketing is competition itself by creating a forum for contests
between competing institutions.56 In order to protect the
integrity of the product, certain rules must be followed, and
following those rules must be a mutual agreement by all
participating institutions.57 The NCAA is pro-competitive
because it plays a vital role in enabling college football to
“preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.”58 Therefore,
the Rule of Reason analysis was the appropriate standard in this
case.59
When employing the Rule of Reason analysis, Justice
Stevens relied on a conclusion made in National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, which held:
[T]hat a restraint of trade is unreasonable may
be . . . ‘based either (1) on the nature or character
of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding
circumstances giving rise to the inference or
presumption that they were intended to restrain
trade and enhance prices. Under either branch of
the test, the inquiry is confined to a consideration
of impact on competitive conditions.60
The NCAA argued that the television plan did not have an
anti-competitive effect by asserting that it did not have the
ability to alter the interaction of supply and demand in the
market, and thus did not have market power. The Court found
that it did not matter whether it had market power because the
absence of market power does not justify a naked restriction on
price or output. Regardless, it found that the NCAA did, in fact,
and output, a fair evaluation of their competitive character requires
consideration of the NCAA’s justifications for the restraints.”).
56. Id. at 101.
57. Id. at 102.
58. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102
(1984).
59. Id. at 103.
60. Id. at 103 (citing Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States 435 U.S.
679, 690 (1978)).
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have market power.61 The Court determined that NCAA’s goal
of protecting fan attendance at live football games was not
effectively accomplished by limiting how many games were
shown on television. More significantly, the Court found that
because the NCAA was attempting to “insulate live ticket sales
from the full spectrum of competition because of the [NCAA’s]
assumption that the product itself is insufficiently attractive to
[consumers,]” they are in conflict with the Sherman Act.62 It was
eventually decided that, even though the NCAA’s goal is to
preserve the integrity of amateur athletics, it went too far when
it imposed the restrictions on a member-school’s ability to
independently negotiate television deals with broadcasters.63
The decision in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n makes it
clear that, not only is the NCAA not immune from scrutiny
under the Sherman Act, but also the impact of the limitations
imposed will be considered in determining whether it is in
violation of the Sherman Act.64 In his complaint, Spielman
alleges the NCAA has engaged in per se violations of the
Sherman Act by alleging IMG and its co-conspirators Honda and
Nike have engaged in an unreasonable restraint of trade
through price-fixing and a group boycott or refusal to deal.65 By
alleging per se violations, Spielman is asserting that the NCAA
cannot make a valid argument that its practices are justified by
being pro-competitive. Even if a court decides that these are not
per se violations and the Rule of Reason analysis is applied, it is
unlikely the NCAA would be able to overcome the precedent set
in Board of Regents because the impact of the limitation imposed
would be considered. The impact in Spielman’s case is that he
does not have the opportunity to negotiate licensing deals for the
name, image, and likeness he created, even though he is not

61. Id. at 111.
62. Id. at 117 (“[T]he Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on
the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable” (alteration in original)
(quoting National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 696)).
63. Id. at 121.
64. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 121
(1984); see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049,
1063 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating “but the NCAA is not asking us to find merely
that its amateurism rules are procompetitive; rather, it asks us to hold that
those rules are essentially exempt from antitrust scrutiny” (footnote omitted)).
65. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
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currently an NCAA athlete and is not bound by the procompetitive amateurism and compensation rules; this impact
appears to be significant.
D. The O’Bannon Decision
In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that the NCAA’s rules
prohibiting NCAA athletes from receiving compensation for
their name, image, and likeness violated the Sherman Act.66
Spielman bases his Sherman Act claims on this decision,67 but a
Ninth Circuit precedent is not binding in the Sixth Circuit,
where his case would be heard on appeal. What makes
Spielman’s case more intriguing is the potential for a circuit split
should the Sixth Circuit decide his case differently than the
Ninth did in O’Bannon. A circuit split on an issue that is likely
to be raised again in other jurisdictions may compel the Supreme
Court of the United States to weigh in.
From the late 1990’s until about 2013, Electronic Arts
(“EA”), a software company, produced video games based on
NCAA football and men’s basketball. These games would depict
virtual images of collegiate athletes and allow users to play as
their favorite college teams and players in their respective
sports.68
In 2008, Ed O’Bannon, a former All-American
basketball player at UCLA, was told by his friend’s son that his
persona was being used in one of these video games.69 A virtual
representation of O’Bannon, as indicated by its physical
likeness, and other demonstrative features, such as his former
jersey number, were among the features in the game.70
Consequently, O’Bannon initiated a lawsuit against the NCAA
and the company used to license trademarks, Collegiate
Licensing Company, because he had not consented to and had
not been compensated for the use of his likeness in the game.71
Eventually, O’Bannon’s motion for class certification under
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

802 F.3d at 1056.
Class Action Complaint, supra note 1, at 4.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure72 for injunctive
and declaratory relief was granted.73 The class was defined as:
All current and former student-athletes residing
in the United States who compete on, or competed
on, an NCAA Division I . . . college or university
men’s basketball team or on an NCAA Football
Bowl Subdivision . . . men’s football team and
whose images, likenesses and/or names may be, or
have been, included or could have been included
(by virtue of their appearance in a team roster) in
game footage or in videogames licensed or sold by
Defendants, their co-conspirators, or their
licensees.74
The District Court began their analysis by identifying the
markets in which the NCAA allegedly restrained trade.75 The
schools that compete with each other to recruit the best high
school athletes do so, not only by offering scholarships, but also
promoting their coaching expertise, athletic facilities, and the
potential opportunity to face high-quality athletic competition.
These schools compete in what the Court called the “college
education market.”76 The Court found that this market is
cognizable under the antitrust laws because there is simply no
substitute market that would be able to provide this unique
bundle of goods services.77 After applying the Rule of Reason
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
73. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
74. Id. at 1055–56 (quoting O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
75. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056.
76. Id. at 1056–57. The Court also found that there was a “group
licensing market,” in which athletes would be able to sell group licenses for the
use of their name, image, and likeness if not for the NCAA’s compensation
rules. However, it was eventually decided that the NCAA’s rules do not have
an anticompetitive effect on this market. Id. at 1057.
77. Id. at 1056. The Court made this decision after it was determined
that “athletes talented enough to play FBS football or Division I basketball opt
not to attend an FBS/Division I school; hardly any choose to attend an FCS,
Division II, or Division III school or to compete in minor or foreign professional
sports leagues, and athletes are not allowed to join either the [National
Football League] or the [National Basketball Association] directly from high
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analysis, the Court determined that the NCAA’s rules have anticompetitive effect on the college education market, but that
these rules serve a pro-competitive purpose. However, these
pro-competitive purposes could be achieved by using less
restrictive and alternative restraints and that the rules were,
therefore, unlawful.78 The result of this case was that schools
were now allowed to compensate NCAA athletes on FBS football
and Division I men’s basketball teams with grants-in-aid that
totaled up to the full cost of attendance.79
The NCAA argued that its rule prohibiting NCAA athletes
from receiving compensation for their name, image, and likeness
is pro-competitive because the rule preserves amateurism,
promotes a competitive balance between participating schools,
integrates academics and athletics, and increases output in the
college education market.80 The Court agreed that amateurism
“helps preserve consumer demand for college sports”81 and that
integrating academics and athletics is a viable pro-competitive
justification for the NCAA’s regulation of the college education
market,82 but rejected the NCAA’s other arguments.
Eventually a settlement was reached, and somewhere
between 200,000 and 300,000 former college football players
whose likenesses were used in the game were compensated with
“something substantive.”83 Also, EA stopped producing the
college football game altogether.84
school.” Id.
78. Id. at 1057.
79. Id. at 1061. The District Court also held that NCAA member-schools
could pay student-athletes up to $5,000 per year and that these funds would
be held in trust and distributed after the student-athlete leaves school.
However, this holding was eventually overturned on appeal by the Ninth
Circuit because it found that paying student-athletes in this way does not
promote amateurism and, therefore, has a procompetitive effect. Id. at 1076.
80. Id. at 1058.
81. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2015).
82. Id. at 1059–60. However, the Court found that the benefits which
arise from integrating athletics and academics are not the result of the NCAA’s
rules restricting compensation, but rather other rules such as requiring
student-athletes to attend class. Id. at 1060.
83. Darren Rovell, EA Sports Settles with Ex-Players, ESPN (Sept. 26,
2013), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/9728042/ea-sports-stopproducing-college-football-game.
84. Id.
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The lower Court that decided this case raised an interesting
point that should be considered in Spielman’s lawsuit and in the
greater conversation about whether college athletes should be
compensated.
[T]he college education market can be thought of
as a market in which student-athletes are sellers
rather than buyers and the schools are purchasers
of athletic services . . . the college education
market is a monopsony—a market in which there
is only one buyer (the NCAA schools, acting
collectively) for a particular good or service (the
labor and [name, image, and likeness] rights of
student-athletes), and the colleges’ agreement not
to pay anything to purchase recruits’ [name,
image,
and
likeness]
causes
harm
to
competition.85
This case is significant to Spielman because there is a
precedent, though not binding, for a federal court to hold that
the NCAA’s rules prohibiting NCAA athletes from receiving
compensation for their name, image, and likeness violates the
Sherman Act.86 The District Court of Ohio and, if the case is
appealed, the Sixth Circuit is likely to consider this decision
when adjudicating Spielman’s claims. The District Court’s
statement is potentially influential to the trending culture shift
that is taking place in which more people are starting to agree
that not just former, but current, college athletes deserve some
of the wealth generated in NCAA athletics. If the view of the
District Court—that students are sellers and schools are
buyers—becomes a mainstream idea, then a change in the way
college athletics are viewed by the public and governing bodies
may develop, which could result in an opportunity for college
athletes to receive monetary compensation.

85. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1058 (citing O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973).
86. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056.
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E. The Lanham Act § 43(a)
The Lanham Act allows civil remedies when someone is
harmed by an unfair competition in a business transaction.87
Unfair competition is defined as: “[d]ishonest or fraudulent
rivalry in trade and commerce; [especially] the practice of
endeavoring to substitute one’s own goods or products in the
markets for those of another . . . by means of imitating or
counterfeiting the name, title, size, shape, or distinctive
peculiarities of the article . . . or general appearance of the
package.”88 The Lanham Act allows a plaintiff to bring a federal
civil action against any person who, in a commercial setting,
deceives others in a way that creates confusion as to who the
plaintiff is affiliated with.89 The element that must be shown in
order to succeed on a claim brought under Section 43(a) is that
the actions of the defendant are likely to cause confusion as to
who the plaintiff is actually affiliated with commercially.90
Courts have held that Section 43(a) should be broadly construed.
In BBB of Metropolitan Houston, Inc. v. Medical Directors, Inc.,
the Court stated that “[l]iability under Section 43(a) is not
restricted to literal falsehoods, but extends as well to misleading
impressions created by the clever use of innuendo, indirect
intimations and ambiguous suggestions.”91
Spielman alleges that OSU used his professional
accomplishments and goodwill to sell the merchandise of
corporate sponsors Honda and Nike. The Complaint specifically
alleges that the inference which consumers were supposed to
draw from the banners depicting Spielman’s picture was that,
much like Spielman, the products of the corporate sponsors
“perform at a high level.”92 Spielman makes a claim under the
Lanham Act because he asserts that the use of his name, image,
and likeness on a corporate-sponsored banner is likely to deceive
people and consumers into thinking that Spielman is associated
87. CHRISTOPHER M. ERNST, BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE: OHIO TORT LAW
§ 56:2 (West 2d ed. 2017).
88. Unfair Competition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2017).
89. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
90. ERNST, supra note 87.
91. Id. (quoting 509 F. Supp. 811, 814 (S.D. Tex. 1981)).
92. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1 at 22.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss1/9

18

ARTICLE 9_MCINTYRE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

NCAA AMATEURISM RULES

3/9/2019 12:00 AM

499

with or sponsored by Honda and/or Nike. Ultimately, Spielman
wants the Court to permanently enjoin the Defendants from
using his name, image, and likeness because it amounts to
unfair competition, as well as the minimal amount of damages
that can be pursued in federal court—$75,000.
Courts have applied an eight-step inquiry, known as the
Frisch Test, in order to determine whether confusion was
caused.93 The Frisch Test comes from a case in which the name
of a restaurant was in dispute—a local restaurant owner wanted
to use the same name as a corporate chain in its
advertisements.94 The Ninth Circuit held that eight factors
would be considered when determining if the action of the
Defendant would likely cause confusion among consumers.
Those eight factors are: (1) strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2)
relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence
of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely
degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the
mark; (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.95 It should
be noted that, as a trier of fact makes this analysis, it is not
necessary for it to find that actual consumer confusion was
present—imminence or threat of confusion is enough.96
Similarly, if the trier of fact finds that the representation made
by the defendant is precise or substantially similar then that is
enough to presume confusion.97 When such confusion is present,
a person may bring about a cause of action for unfair competition
under the Lanham Act.98
In light of this analysis, it is likely that a court would
determine that the representation of Spielman produced by the
Defendants on the banners without his consent would cause
confusion among consumers. Spielman alleges a violation of the
Lanham Act because these corporate-sponsored banners with
pictures of Spielman playing football at Ohio State were hung in
93. ERNST, supra note 87.
94. Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d
642, 644 (6th Cir. 1982).
95. Id. at 648 (citing Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 790
(9th Cir. 1981)) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
96. ERNST, supra note 87 at § 56:34.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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the football stadium without his permission. The presumption
of confusion would, therefore, be present because the
representation of Spielman is precise—it is actually him
pictured on the banners.
Around the same time that O’Bannon was bringing his
claims under the Sherman Act against EA, a video game
developer, another former football player was bringing claims
under the Lanham Act for similar conduct against the same
Defendant. Jim Brown, widely regarded as one of the best
football players of all time,99 sued EA for using his name, image,
and likeness in a video game. O’Bannon brought his claims
against EA for using these features in a video game that depicted
college players, while Brown took issue with EA’s video game
that depicted professional players. EA’s Madden NFL series
allows users to play as NFL players; some versions of the game
allow players to play as former NFL players, such as Jim Brown.
The NFL and the NFL Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) entered
into licensing deals with EA to use the names, images, and
likenesses of NFL players for their game. Brown took issue with
the representations of himself in the game because he was no
longer in the NFL or the NFLPA, did not consent to the use of
his name, image, or likeness, and was not compensated.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the appropriate
framework to apply in this case, rather than the likelihood of
confusion test employed in Frisch, would be the Rogers test.100
The Court maintained that the Madden NFL series constituted
artistic expression which is protected under the First
Amendment, and there was precedent in the Ninth Circuit
which held that the method for balancing rights under the
Lanham Act and rights under the First Amendment in cases
involving expressive works is the Rogers test.101 The Ninth
Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s precedent that video games
are expressive works and deserve the same protection as more
traditional forms of expression.102
99. Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2011).
100. Id. at 1241–1242.
101. Id. (citing Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901–02
(9th Cir. 2002).
102. Id. at 1241 (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786
(2011).
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In Rogers v. Grimaldi, Ginger Rogers sued producers and
distributors of a movie for the use of a movie a title that obliquely
related to her and a deceased entertainment partner, Fred
Astaire.103 Rogers and Astaire are among the most famous duos
in show business history.104 The Defendants in this case used
their names for the title of a fictional movie, which they
contended they were allowed to do because prohibiting them to
do so would be a violation of their right to express themselves
freely in their own artistic work.105 The Second Circuit
introduced a two-pronged test which determines whether the
Lanham Act should or should not be applied to expressive works.
“[U]nless the [use of the trademark or other identifying
material] has no artistic relevance to the underlying work
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the
[trademark or other identifying material] explicitly misleads as
to the source or the content of the work.”106 With this test, the
Court held that the Defendants had not violated Rogers’ rights
under the Lanham Act because it did not explicitly mislead
consumers.107
In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit held that “‘the level of
[artistic] relevance [of the trademark or other identifying
material to the work] merely must be above zero’ for the
trademark or other identifying material to be deemed
artistically relevant.”108 In Brown, the Court determined that
without the use of Brown’s name, image, and likeness, users
would not have been able to immerse themselves in the
experience of playing the game with the virtual depictions of the
1965 Cleveland Browns, of which Brown was a member. In
order to satisfy the Rogers test and apply the Lanham Act,
Brown would have had to have shown that the use of his name,
image, and likeness had no artistic relevance to the underlying
work whatsoever. The Court felt that the use of Brown’s
characteristics had some artistic relevance to the Defendant’s

103. 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 996–997 (noting the title of the movie was Ginger and Fred).
106. Brown, 724 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
107. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001–02.
108. Brown, 724 F.3d at 1243 (alterations in original) (quoting E.S.S.
Entm’t v. Rock Star Videos, Inc. 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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video games.109
In Spielman’s case, he must also show that the use of his
name, image, and likeness has no artistic relevance. This will
be a difficult argument for Spielman to make. It seems that OSU
would be able to easily assert the defense that Spielman’s image
has artistic relevance much the same way that Brown’s did. By
hanging the banners of former players, OSU could say they were
trying to create a certain atmosphere in their sporting facilities,
and that the images they used offered a certain degree of artistic
expression that helped in creating this atmosphere. If OSU was
using the name, image, and likeness of former players in a way
that was more clearly commercial, then Spielman may have a
better chance of arguing that there is no artistic relevance, but
that does not appear to be the case.
The second prong of the Rogers test requires that the creator
use the material to “explicitly mislead[ consumers] as to the
source or content of the work.”110 The appropriate inquiry made
in Brown, as applied to Spielman, would be: whether the use of
Spielman’s likeness would confuse people who attend football
games at OSU into thinking that Spielman is somehow involved
in the corporate sponsored banners, or that he endorses Honda
or Nike’s products, and whether there was an explicit
misstatement that causes the consumer confusion.111 The
distinction that the material must explicitly mislead is crucial
to the analysis. In order to prevail under the Lanham Act,
Spielman must show that OSU and IMG used his name, image,
and likeness in a way that showed consumers that Spielman
unequivocally endorsed the corporate sponsored banners. It is
not enough to show that consumers may draw an incorrect
inference as to Spielman’s endorsement.112 For example, the
Court in Brown determined that EA did not explicitly mislead
consumers, despite productions of evidence that consumers were
actually mislead. Under this analysis, Spielman’s claim under
the Lanham Act is not likely to prevail. The banners in question
depict an image of Spielman while he was playing football for
OSU. The Defendants will likely be able to successfully defend
109.
110.
111.
112.
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Id. at 1245 (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
Brown, 724 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
Id.
Id. at 1246.
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these claims by asserting the position that they did not explicitly
mislead consumers as to Spielman’s affiliation with Honda or
Nike by hanging a large picture of Spielman in a stadium in
which he used to play, and that the banners amount to artistic
expression.
F. Deceptive Trade Practices
The Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act is essentially the
State’s version of the Lanham Act. In Chandler & Associates,
Inc. v. America’s Healthcare Alliance, Inc. the Court stated that
“[w]hen adjudicating claims under the Ohio Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, Ohio courts shall apply the same analysis
applicable to claims commenced under analogous federal law.”113
However, being found liable for violations of the Lanham Act
does not necessarily mean that the defendant would be held
liable under Ohio law, unless the case involves a trademark.114
Spielman’s Complaint does not claim that his name, injury, and
likeness is trademarked.115 The Ohio law and the Lanham Act
are similar in that they both prohibit behavior that causes the
likelihood of confusion as to the affiliation of one person or entity
with another.116
G. Right of Publicity
The philosophy behind Right of Publicity or Personality
Rights is the idea that “it is the inherent right of every human
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”117 In
the state of Ohio, any person who owns all of their rights of
publicity may bring a civil action to enforce those rights.118 A
person would not be able to sue if the entity using their identity
113. ERNST, supra note 87, at § 56:16 (quoting 709 N.E.2d 190, 195 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1997)).
114. Id.
115. See generally Class Action Complaint, supra note 1.
116. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02 (West 2018); see also Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
117. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d
ed. Westlaw 2018).
118. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.06 (West 2018).
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is authorized to do so. The action brought would be a commercial
tort of unfair competition,119 so the Ohio law imitates the
Lanham Act in this way.
In Vinci v. American Can Co., an Olympic weight lifter and
a class of other Olympic athletes brought an action for invasion
of privacy for the use of name, image, and likeness on a series of
promotional drinking cups.120 The Ohio Court of Appeals stated
in its opinion that “[n]o one has the right to [sue] merely because
his name or his appearance is brought before the public, since
neither is in any way a private matter and both are open to
public observation.”121 When the defendant uses the plaintiff’s
name, image, and likeness, and the value of that therein, and
appropriates the value for its own commercial benefit, then the
plaintiff’s rights are invaded.
In an interview regarding this lawsuit, Spielman clarified
his position by saying, “Ohio State is more than welcome to use
my name and image in any way they want to use it. The problem
is when they slap a corporate sponsor on it.”122 With this
statement, Spielman addresses the issue the Court is likely to
consider when analyzing his state law claims. It is no secret that
Spielman played for OSU, so there is no harm done when OSU,
or anyone for that matter, hangs his picture up somewhere. A
situation such as this is no different than printing his name,
image, and likeness in a newspaper, as the Vinci Court
commented.123 However, Spielman’s reputation has value, and
he is entitled to profit from that value. When another entity
appropriates that value for its own commercial benefit, in this
case through corporate sponsorships, then harm is done. If OSU
had simply hung his picture up to improve the aesthetic of the

119. MCCARTHY, supra note 119.
120. 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio Ct. App.1990).
121. Id. at 794 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351
N.E.2d 454, 458 n.4 (Ohio 1976)).
122. Chris Spielman Files Lawsuit Against Ohio State to Block Use of
Player Images, FREE REPUBLIC (July 15, 2017, 5:51 AM), http://www.free
republic.com/focus/f-chat/3569383/posts.
123. Vinci, 591 N.E.2d at 794 (stating “[t]he fact that the defendant is
engaged in the business of publication, for example of a newspaper, out of
which he makes or seeks to make a profit, is not enough to make the incidental
publication a commercial use of the name or likeness.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Zacchini, 351 N.E.2d at 458 n.4)).
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stadium, which in turn would likely draw more fans to the game,
it would seem that OSU is deriving a commercial benefit from
the use of his name, image, and likeness; however, that is not
necessarily prohibited. Because OSU profited from the banners
through the corporate sponsorships of Honda and Nike, the
necessary appropriation of value required to be held liable under
this law seems to be present.
V. Discussion: The Possible Impact of a Favorable
Decision for Spielman
It is important to remember how Spielman’s and
O’Bannon’s cases are different—the biggest difference being the
Defendants; O’Bannon sued the NCAA, while Spielman is suing
OSU and IMG. The NCAA refused to settle with O’Bannon, and
the case was brought all the way to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. OSU might be more willing to settle this case before it
gets that far. However, judging from the comments Spielman
has made regarding his goals in pursuing this lawsuit,124 it is
likely that Spielman will forego the opportunity to settle in order
to have the case litigated in federal court.
In light of that consideration, if this case is brought before
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, then there would be two
Circuit Courts that agree that former college athletes should be
able to negotiate compensation for the use of their name, image,
and likeness. The Supreme Court of the United States declined
to grant certiorari to the defendants in O’Bannon. Should the
Ninth and Sixth Circuits agree, then the Supreme Court would
likely decline to hear Spielman’s case as well. A favorable
decision may encourage other similarly situated people not
named in Spielman’s class to pursue claims such as this in other
jurisdictions. A favorable decision for Spielman creates more
precedent that is likely to weigh heavily in favor of those possible
plaintiffs. Schools across the country and their licensing agents
may be subject to duplicative lawsuits that they would have
difficulty defending based on that precedent. A victory for

124. Athletic Staff, supra note 7. (noting that Spielman’s stated concern
is the exploitation of all former players, and that he does not have a financial
interest in the outcome).
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Spielman in this case will likely continue to change the
landscape of how college athletes are, or are not, compensated
for the use of their name, image, and likeness much like
O’Bannon has done.
If former players are given this firm footing to stand on
when making these claims, it may open the door for current
players to negotiate compensation for use of their name, image,
and likeness. If that happens, then the NCAA’s rules against
compensation could be in jeopardy. If current players are
allowed to be compensated for the use of their personal features,
then this could potentially lead to them being compensated for
other purposes, such as for their athletic abilities.
Allowing current players to receive compensation at the
very least could affect the NCAA’s ability to prohibit athletes
from organizing a union. With union representation, college
athletes may be able to negotiate benefits much the same way
that the players’ unions in professional sports have done. The
goal of the fairly recent attempt to organize by college football
players at Northwestern University was to prevent players from
having to pay the bills for injuries they received while playing
college sports.125 With all of the discussions regarding how
dangerous head injuries are, especially in the NFL,126 this could
be a huge financial burden for the NCAA and participating
schools.127
In this way, Spielman’s case represents something so much
larger than his ability to profit from his reputation. It
represents an idea that is so uniquely American—that people
should be paid for the value they hold in the market and for what
they contribute and sacrifice for the sake of commerce. If a
favorable decision in Spielman’s case follows the trajectory of the
argument put forth, then college athletics will experience such a
significant change that it may form a totally different market
from what the NCAA is today. The usual path of athletes going

125. Loretta8, supra note 6.
126. Brian Resnick, What a Lifetime of Playing Football Can Do to the
Human Brain, VOX (Feb. 3, 2019, 10:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-andhealth/2018/2/2/16956440/super-bowl-2018-concussion-cte-nfl-brain-damage.
127. Ken Belson, N.F.L. Agrees to Settle Concussion Suit for $765 Million,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/
sports/football/judge-announces-settlement-in-nfl-concussion-suit.html.
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from high school to college and then to professional leagues could
become a thing of the past in lieu of some other alternative, such
as new leagues where up-and-coming athletes can compete in a
league similar to the NCAA without having to simultaneously
attend school.
VI. Conclusion
Assuming that Spielman is able to achieve class action
status on his federal claims and the judge in the District Court
of Ohio rules that the case should be heard in federal court
rather than the Ohio Court of Claims, there is an opportunity to
have the case brought before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
This is significant because there was already a similar case
brought before the Ninth Circuit.128 If Spielman’s case gets that
far, it will be significant regardless of the outcome. If the Sixth
Circuit makes a decision that is different from the Ninth
Circuit’s, then there will a circuit split, and the Supreme Court
of the United States may decide to grant certiorari. If the Sixth
Circuit decides to follow the precedent set in the Ninth Circuit,
then similar lawsuits may be filed in the future with the
jurisprudence of two circuit courts weighing heavily in favor of
the plaintiffs.
The NCAA’s rules against compensation state that no
college player can receive payment for their contributions to
athletics—they may not enter into licensing deals or contracts
with agencies and they may not be associated with any
professional team in any way.129 The Supreme Court has held
that the NCAA is a market because the goods and services that
they offer cannot be found elsewhere.130 College athletes are
participants in this market. Because of the rules against
compensation, these market participants can argue that the
NCAA rules unreasonably restrain trade.
The Sherman Act is a federal statute that promotes and
maintains the free market that is inherent to the American
128. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
129. Amateurism, supra note 11.
130. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468
U.S. 85 (1984).
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economy. The free market relies on competition between
businesses, and any attempt to restrain trade through
monopolies and trusts is prohibited.131 The Supreme Court has
held that the NCAA is subject to anti-trust scrutiny under the
Sherman Act.132 Unless the NCAA can provide sufficient
arguments that their compensation rules promote a procompetitive purpose, then its compensation rules may be in
jeopardy.
The banners that depict Spielman’s image, which are the
subject of his lawsuit, are an infringement of his rights of
publicity under the Lanham Act and Ohio State law because
they are likely to cause confusion as to who Spielman is affiliated
with. It is reasonable to assume that someone seeing Spielman
on these corporate-sponsored banners would believe that
Spielman is in some way associated with those corporations;
however, he is not.
Whether Spielman is successful in these claims largely
depends on the analysis that the Court uses. Depending on the
analysis, the issue becomes one of the following: whether the use
of Spielman’s name, image, and likeness is likely to cause
confusion as to his affiliations, whether the banners have artistic
relevance, and whether OSU explicitly misled consumers as to
Spielman’s affiliations.133 If the Court decides that consumers
were misled by OSU, Spielman will have more difficulty
succeeding in his claims under the Lanham Act. In order to
succeed in his state law right of publicity claim, Spielman will
have to show that the value of his name, image, and likeness was
appropriated to another entity by OSU.134 Because the banners
were sponsored and the resulting revenue went to OSU, rather
than Spielman, it is likely he will be able to succeed in this claim.
Spielman’s best argument is that he is no longer subject to
NCAA regulations because he is no longer a collegiate athlete.
Therefore, the NCAA’s rules against compensation should not
apply to him despite the fact that the name, image, and likeness
131. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
132. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 468 U.S. 85.
133. See generally Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville,
Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994,
996 (2d Cir. 1989).
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4165.02 (West 2018).
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in question came from a time when he was subject to NCAA
regulations. The fact that Spielman maintained a valuable
reputation while he was a member of the NCAA should not bar
him from profiting from that reputation after his membership
ended. It is also important to note that the NCAA is not a party
in this lawsuit, as Spielman is suing OSU and IMG.135
Regardless of how this case is decided, it will be significant
to current and former NCAA athletes. Success for Spielman
could mean sweeping changes to form and execution of amateur
athletics as we know it.

135. Class Action Complaint, supra note 1.
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